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1. Introduction 
Ubiquitous Sensor Networks (USNs) have become one of the important paradigms in sensor network systems. 
The availability and pervasiveness of mobile devices (estimated to be around 7.5 billion in 20161) and Internet of 
Things-enabled devices (expected to reach 30 billion by 20202) have opened up new opportunities that have the 
potential to address a wide range of issues that affect the individual and its community in several areas including 
environmental monitoring, transportation, entertainment, security, and healthcare.  The unrestricted adoption of this 
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Table 1. A comparison of features of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) and Ubiquitous Sensor Networks (USNs). 
 
Features Wireless	  Sensor	  Networks Ubiquitous	  Sensor	  Networks 
Computational 
Capabilities 
Devices	  are	  battery-­‐powered	  and	  designed	  
for	  low-­‐power	  consumption.	  Devices	  are	  
limited	  in	  computational	  power,	  memory	  and	  
communication.	  WSNs	  are	  left	  unattended	  
for	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  Make	  use	  of	  
custom-­‐made	  devices. 
Devices	  with	  GHz	  multi-­‐core	  processors	  and	  
memory	  in	  the	  GB	  range	  are	  typical.	  Devices	  have	  
rechargeable	  batteries	  or	  they	  are	  connected	  to	  a	  
reliable	  power	  source.	  Make	  use	  of	  Commercial	  
Off-­‐The-­‐Shelf	  (COTS)	  devices,	  sensors	  and	  
operating	  systems. 
Communication	  
Infrastructure 
Devices	  must	  collaborate	  to	  perform	  ad-­‐hoc	  
network	  routing	  and	  maintenance. 
Single	  network	  interface	  with	  low-­‐power	  
protocols	  (e.g.,	  802.15.4)	  is	  used. 
Devices	  may	  have	  multiple	  network	  interfaces,	  
with	  infrastructure-­‐based	  networks	  (e.g.	  ISPs,	  
cellular	  networks)	  and	  end-­‐to-­‐end	  TCP/IP	  
communication. 
Communication	  
Security 
Cross-­‐layer	  design	  for	  security	  is	  needed	  due	  
to	  low	  power	  and	  limited	  computational	  
capabilities. 
Use	  of	  standard	  protocols	  such	  as	  Transport	  
Layer	  Security	  (TLS)	  and	  common	  cryptographic	  
algorithms/protocols	  (e.g.,	  AES,	  RC4,	  elliptic	  
curve)	  provide	  end-­‐to-­‐end	  security.	  Assumes	  
reliable	  communication	  by	  Internet	  Service	  
Providers	  (ISPs). 
Network	  
Management 
Single	  entity	  manages	  and	  controls	  the	  WSN.	  
Devices	  are	  designed	  and	  deployed	  for	  a	  
single	  purpose.	  Devices	  participate	  in	  a	  single	  
WSN	  at	  a	  time. 
Multiple	  entities	  participate	  in	  the	  management	  
of	  the	  USN	  with	  multiple	  roles.	  Data	  collection	  
tasks	  may	  be	  issued	  by	  more	  than	  one	  entity	  and	  
devices	  can	  be	  used	  to	  address	  many	  purposes.	  	  
Devices	  may	  participate	  in	  more	  than	  one	  USN	  
simultaneously. 
Network	  
Maintenance 
Performed	  by	  the	  entity	  that	  owns	  the	  WSN.	  
Network	  can	  be	  costly	  to	  deploy	  and	  
maintain. 
Performed	  by	  the	  custodians	  of	  data	  collection	  
devices	  and	  entities	  collecting	  data.	  Can	  be	  
potentially	  cheap	  to	  maintain.	  May	  depend	  on	  
participation	  by	  users/custodians	  to	  accomplish	  
the	  goals	  of	  the	  USN. 
Scalability Potentially	  thousands	  of	  devices	  in	  a	  single	  
system. 
Potentially	  billions	  of	  devices	  in	  a	  single	  system. 
 
 
sensing paradigm presents significant security challenges and risks. In this paper, we present an overview of these 
issues as well as solutions that can be considered to address them. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents architectural models and applications for USNs. In section 3 we discuss security issues for 
Ubiquitous Sensor Networks (USNs). Section 4 presents solutions to secure USNs. In section 5 we present open 
challenges. Section 6 presents some concluding remarks. 
2. Architectures  and Applications of Ubiquitous Sensor Networks 
Ubiquitous Sensor Networks (USNs) are sensor networks that make use of Internet-connected devices to serve as 
a sensing platform to collect data of interest3. Usually these devices are owned (or are in custody) by common 
citizens; however USNs can be deployed by using devices owned by the government as well as private-sector 
companies. USNs differ in various aspects with respect to Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) (table 1).  The most 
important differences among these two classes of networks are that devices in USNs are more powerful than their 
counterparts in WSNs, the communication between devices in USNs depends on infrastructure-based networks and 
the Internet, and typically there is human involvement in the collection of data. The typical hardware architecture of 
USNs consists of the following components3: 
• Sensors: The major functionality of these components of the architecture is to collect data. Sensor software and 
middleware technologies collect data from the hardware sensors and transfer it to the first-level integrators. Sensors 
are wired to the first-level integrator devices, or they may be connected via personal area networks such as 
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Bluetooth, Near Field Communication (NFC), 802.15.4 (Zigbee) or some other wireless Local Area Network (LAN) 
technology. 
• First-level integrators: The roles of first-level integrators are to perform initial data verification, aggregation 
and basic analysis (e.g., feature extraction) on the data collected by sensors. Any device that supports IP-based 
communication can serve as a first-level integrator. Examples include smartphones and Internet-connected devices. 
• Data transport: In USNs, data transport is provided by any IP-based communication network that enables the 
end-to-end transfer of data from the first-level integrators to the second-level integrators. The data transport role is 
performed by Internet Service Providers (ISPs). 
• Second-level integrators: These components collect and store data sent from first-level integrators. They also 
provide analytics services and feedback to first-level integrator devices and to external entities. Second-level 
integrators are implemented by servers and/or cloud-based services. 
USNs are currently deployed in several application fields, including environmental monitoring, entertainment, 
transportation, security, and healthcare. These applications can be grouped into four major categories: (1) Location-
based systems (LBS); (2) Community-based sensing systems (CBS); (3) Human-centric sensing systems (HCS); (4) 
hybrid systems. Available since the late 1990’s, LBS systems make use of location sensors to receive/collect 
geotagged data4,5. CBS systems (also known as crowdsensing) track variables of interest for communities (e.g., 
neighborhoods, cities, citizen associations, leisure/gaming associations, government). Such variables may include 
pollution, noise, state and congestion of streets, among others6,55-57. CBS can be classified as participatory or 
opportunistic7. HCS systems track human-related variables such as physiological variables with the goal of 
improving the wellbeing of individuals. Some examples of HCS are security and safety systems (e.g., home security, 
human-fall detection), Mobile health (M-Health) and personal health systems (e.g., fitness tracking) 8,58. Finally, 
hybrid systems incorporate characteristics of these three previous groups. Examples in this last group include games 
such as Pokemon GO 59. 
3. Security Issues in Ubiquitous Sensor Networks  
Since USN devices are more powerful than their WSN counterparts and USN integrator devices make use of 
protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) to establish end-to-end secure communication channels between 
integrators over the Internet, many of the WSN security issues related to the establishment of secure channels (e.g., 
key distribution, implementation of cryptographic protocols in resource-constrained devices) and network 
maintenance (e.g., ad-hoc routing) are non-existent in USNs. Consequently, given the features of USNs presented in 
table 1, we classify the security issues for USNs into two major categories: (1) data integrity; (2) system availability.  
3.1. Data Integrity  
In USNs, users may have control over several sensors and data collecting devices9. Their direct access to these 
components could be utilized to launch spoofing attacks by submitting false, incorrect, or fake data10. Similarly, a 
second type of spoofing attack on the sensors could be performed by tampering and modifying the physical 
environment (i.e., for a temperature sensor, this type of attack would increase the room temperature on purpose). In 
this case, although the sensor’s readings are correct, the sensed data are generated from fake or tampered 
environments 11.  In human-centric sensing systems, including m-Health and fitness tracking systems, data integrity 
is critical. M-Health applications collect health-related data and provide feedback that could include the operation of 
intrusive actions at a patient’s body automatically (e.g., deliver medication). In such cases, the violation of data 
integrity can have serious, life-threatening consequences. This aspect in human-centric USNs raises another major 
security concern which is the authentication of sensors and users when performing data collection 12,13. 
3.2. System Availability 
Since data transport in USNs is provided by ISPs, it is assumed that ISPs provide reliable networks to support the 
communication between integrators. Therefore, there are three ways one can launch attacks on system availability in 
USNs as follows: 
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• Availability at First-level Integrators: In USNs, we identify these attacks as follows: (1) attacking the 
communication infrastructure between sensors and the first-level integrator devices by interfering with the 
communication media 14,16; (2) attacking and/or depleting the power supply with battery exhaustion attacks 17,18; or 
(3) making the operating system unresponsive by exploiting security vulnerabilities of the host operating system19,21. 
• Availability at Second-level Integrators: Two major issues arise when managing availability for second-level 
integrator devices: (1) elasticity; (2) Denial of Service (DoS). Even though the result of not managing both issues 
correctly is the same (no availability), they differ in terms of availability. Elasticity deals with the ability of the 
system or the service to satisfy and adapt to workload changes 23, whereas DoS are deliberate attacks to the system 
or the service itself by malicious parties 24. 
• Attacks on User Participation: USNs require the participation and collaboration from users and custodians to 
collect data and enable the system to provide a certain level of Quality of Information (QoI)9,22 to be useful. Attacks 
on user participation may include availability attacks at first-level integrators and human aspects that may refrain 
users from contributing and collecting data (e.g., lack of motivation to participate, reputation of the USN system). If 
users are not willing to participate, the system will not collect data to provide the feedback at the level required by 
its stakeholders, resulting on a similar situation as an availability attack on the USN. 
4. Securing Ubiquitous Sensor Networks  
This section discusses the security solutions that can mitigate the attacks discussed in section 3. The issues along 
with their solutions are summarized in table 2.  
4.1. Data Integrity  
We can prevent eavesdropping and data integrity attacks by protecting communication channels through 
encryption from sensors to first-level integrators, and from first-level integrators to second-level integrators. 
However, faulty sensor readings and users’ actions such as tampering with sensors (or the environment) are 
examples where encryption alone does not help to maintain data integrity in USNs. In this section, we provide 
methods available to deal with data integrity. 
• Estimation and Filtering: For certain types of USNs such as community-based systems, the management of 
errors in the data (e.g., wrong measurements, outliers, faulty sensor readings) assumes that there are enough 
participants such that the redundancy (of first-level integrators) along with statistical models can handle errors in the 
data at a macro level25,27 without affecting the estimation performed by the system. Examples of techniques for 
estimation and filtering of data used in USNs include interpolation techniques such as kridging, Markov Random 
Fields, Principal Component Analysis25, clustering, Gaussian Mixture Models26, as well as anomaly detection 
algorithms such as unsupervised/supervised machine learning methods (e.g., support vector machines, neural 
networks, Bayesian networks) and parametric/non-parametric methods adapted for anomaly detection 27. 
• User and Sensor Authentication: Solutions to handle authentication in USNs include the utilization of biometric 
methods28,29, smart cards authentication30,31, two-factor authentication methods32,33, and secured brokering hardware 
34,36. The utilization of mobile phone-based biometric authentication methods (e.g., fingerprint sensors, face 
recognition) combined with other wearable and/or implantable sensors may provide interesting approaches to handle 
user authentication35. The utilization of hardware-based, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)37 can provide 
solutions for device authentication, especially since TEEs are currently used in mobile phones as a standard feature 
for network device authentication (e.g., International Mobile Equipment Identity, IMEI)38. 
4.2. System Availability 
   • Availability at First-level Integrators:  Avoiding DoS in communication channels between sensors and first-level 
integrator devices can be achieved using mechanisms such as frequency hopping, repositioning of sensors, 
modification of protocols, and physical layer jamming avoidance techniques (e.g., directional antennas, spread 
spectrum, channel diversity)14. In the case of battery exhaustion attacks, methods may include the development of 
power-aware operating systems and frameworks 39,40, techniques for assessing power consumption of an application 
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communication media 14,16; (2) attacking and/or depleting the power supply with battery exhaustion attacks 17,18; or 
(3) making the operating system unresponsive by exploiting security vulnerabilities of the host operating system19,21. 
• Availability at Second-level Integrators: Two major issues arise when managing availability for second-level 
integrator devices: (1) elasticity; (2) Denial of Service (DoS). Even though the result of not managing both issues 
correctly is the same (no availability), they differ in terms of availability. Elasticity deals with the ability of the 
system or the service to satisfy and adapt to workload changes 23, whereas DoS are deliberate attacks to the system 
or the service itself by malicious parties 24. 
• Attacks on User Participation: USNs require the participation and collaboration from users and custodians to 
collect data and enable the system to provide a certain level of Quality of Information (QoI)9,22 to be useful. Attacks 
on user participation may include availability attacks at first-level integrators and human aspects that may refrain 
users from contributing and collecting data (e.g., lack of motivation to participate, reputation of the USN system). If 
users are not willing to participate, the system will not collect data to provide the feedback at the level required by 
its stakeholders, resulting on a similar situation as an availability attack on the USN. 
4. Securing Ubiquitous Sensor Networks  
This section discusses the security solutions that can mitigate the attacks discussed in section 3. The issues along 
with their solutions are summarized in table 2.  
4.1. Data Integrity  
We can prevent eavesdropping and data integrity attacks by protecting communication channels through 
encryption from sensors to first-level integrators, and from first-level integrators to second-level integrators. 
However, faulty sensor readings and users’ actions such as tampering with sensors (or the environment) are 
examples where encryption alone does not help to maintain data integrity in USNs. In this section, we provide 
methods available to deal with data integrity. 
• Estimation and Filtering: For certain types of USNs such as community-based systems, the management of 
errors in the data (e.g., wrong measurements, outliers, faulty sensor readings) assumes that there are enough 
participants such that the redundancy (of first-level integrators) along with statistical models can handle errors in the 
data at a macro level25,27 without affecting the estimation performed by the system. Examples of techniques for 
estimation and filtering of data used in USNs include interpolation techniques such as kridging, Markov Random 
Fields, Principal Component Analysis25, clustering, Gaussian Mixture Models26, as well as anomaly detection 
algorithms such as unsupervised/supervised machine learning methods (e.g., support vector machines, neural 
networks, Bayesian networks) and parametric/non-parametric methods adapted for anomaly detection 27. 
• User and Sensor Authentication: Solutions to handle authentication in USNs include the utilization of biometric 
methods28,29, smart cards authentication30,31, two-factor authentication methods32,33, and secured brokering hardware 
34,36. The utilization of mobile phone-based biometric authentication methods (e.g., fingerprint sensors, face 
recognition) combined with other wearable and/or implantable sensors may provide interesting approaches to handle 
user authentication35. The utilization of hardware-based, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)37 can provide 
solutions for device authentication, especially since TEEs are currently used in mobile phones as a standard feature 
for network device authentication (e.g., International Mobile Equipment Identity, IMEI)38. 
4.2. System Availability 
   • Availability at First-level Integrators:  Avoiding DoS in communication channels between sensors and first-level 
integrator devices can be achieved using mechanisms such as frequency hopping, repositioning of sensors, 
modification of protocols, and physical layer jamming avoidance techniques (e.g., directional antennas, spread 
spectrum, channel diversity)14. In the case of battery exhaustion attacks, methods may include the development of 
power-aware operating systems and frameworks 39,40, techniques for assessing power consumption of an application 
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Table 2. Security issues and solutions for Ubiquitous Sensor Networks (USNs). 
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or a sensing task before downloaded and installed at a first-level integrator device 41,43, as well as approaches that 
detect an abnormal increase in the power consumption at runtime44,46.  In the case of detecting operating system 
vulnerabilities, the following techniques could be used: (1) static analysis (i.e., analysis of source/compiled code 
before execution by using tools such as Metal47); (2) dynamic analysis (i.e., analysis of programs during their 
execution to detect and document program errors and vulnerabilities48); (3) formal methods (i.e., use of 
mathematical logic and specifications to prove program correctness 49,50). The detection of vulnerabilities is always a 
race against the clock, as they must be corrected before they are exploited by attackers. It is possible for a 
vulnerability/bug to be undetected for many years 21. 
• Availability at Second-level Integrators: To deal with availability at second-level integrators, USN systems 
should focus on addressing the problems of elasticity and denial of service, as mentioned in section 3. Given the 
possibility of billions of Internet-connected devices performing data collection for USNs, not being able to manage 
or cope with different types of workloads will render the system useless. To deal with elasticity in USNs, 
approaches such as hybrids between client-server and peer-to-peer architectures3 and cloud-based solutions 60,61 have 
been proposed. In the case of DoS, the issue is similar to any other service provided on the Internet, therefore 
countermeasures for traditional network infrastructure and cloud-based environments can be used62. 
• User Participation: Salim et al.51 identified that the successful, large-scale user participation in USNs consists 
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of five steps, namely (1) identify needs and dilemmas; (2) identify stakeholders; (3) identify incentives; (4) gather 
evidence and experience; (5) provide tools and affordance. USN systems must provide benefits to the well-being of 
an individual or a community by means of monetary or non-monetary incentives52 as follows: 
• Micropayments: these are monetary incentives that pay small fractions of a dollar to users that contribute data to 
the USN. Micropayments were developed in the 1990’s during the explosion of the Web as an incentive to sell 
online content53 for user-generated content. In the context of USNs, micropayments were first evaluated by Lee 
et al.54 by using algorithms for micropayments based on game theory.  
• Altruistic incentives: Users participate because of the benefits to the community that a USN can provide. 
Common examples include P-Sense6, the Personal Environmental Impact Report (PEIR)55, and NoiseSPY56.    
• Social incentives: In this category the incentives are social or human-centric rewards such as increase of 
reputation, improved health, or exposure from the interaction with other users with common objectives. 
Common examples in this group include e-bird57, fitness application such as Runtastic58 and game such as 
Pokemon GO59.  
5. Security Challenges for Ubiquitous Sensor Networks 
Human intervention, and trust in the devices, tasks, and task issuers are key aspects in the successful deployment 
of future USNs. In this context, we identify some of the current challenges that should be addressed to build more 
robust and secure USNs. These challenges include:  (1) trustworthy tasking; (2) data integrity for human-centric 
USNs; (3) privacy. 
• Trustworthy Tasking: USNs have been developed under the principle that the sensing task and whoever collects 
data are trusted. As such, most of the research in securing USNs assumes that threats are coming from the 
custodians of first-level integrator devices (e.g., by submitting fake data), or an external third-party with the goal of 
disrupting the USN (e.g., by executing a DoS attack on the USN). However, more research is needed on how to trust 
the data collection entity, the sensing task, and the security of the device itself, especially given the utilization of 
COTS devices as integrators and sensors. USN devices could be reprogrammed through a sensing task to steal data 
or could be used as zombies by botnets to attack external parties63, or the task may create physical harm to the user 
(e.g., theft, kidnapping, accidents) 64. 
• Data Integrity for Human-centric USNs: In a human-centric USN, a user usually has one type of sensor of each 
kind. For instance, a user has one heart rate sensor, one ECG sensor, and one breath depth sensor if using a wearable 
such as the Zephyr Bioharness 65, or there might be multiple sensors of one type (e.g., a heart rate sensor on a chest 
strap, and another on a smartwatch). Estimation and filtering of variables of interest in addition to redundancy of 
sensors/multiple first-level integrators as proposed for community-based USNs cannot be utilized because data in 
human-centric systems from a particular user are usually isolated from others due to privacy concerns. New 
techniques are needed to authenticate data in these scenarios. In addition, because feedback in human-centric 
systems could involve intrusive actions automatically (e.g., deliver medication without user intervention), novel 
methods are needed to continuously authenticate the user to ensure the effectiveness of these actions (i.e., some of 
these actions can generate life-threatening consequences). These authentication methods must have the following 
characteristics: 
• Non-repudiation: These methods must guarantee user identity with high assurance.  
• Unobtrusive: These methods must authenticate users without explicit user intervention. Continuous 
authentication methods that request users to authenticate regularly are unrealistic (i.e., not usable from the 
human-computer interaction perspective). 
• Power-aware: Many first-level integrators in human-centric USNs are battery-powered, thus continuous 
authentication methods that generate high power overhead for a first-level integrator device are not useful. 
•  Privacy: The ubiquity and use of mobile and Internet-connected devices as first-level integrators present a 
tradeoff: on one hand it is desired to collect data as accurately as possible, but on the other hand it is imperative that 
we collect or share data in a way that would preserve the privacy of users. Aspects such as context privacy (i.e., 
inference about the actions that could be obtained about users from the sensor data), bystander’s privacy (i.e., 
external people’s privacy that can be affected when collecting data in the USN), data sharing privacy (i.e., 
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of five steps, namely (1) identify needs and dilemmas; (2) identify stakeholders; (3) identify incentives; (4) gather 
evidence and experience; (5) provide tools and affordance. USN systems must provide benefits to the well-being of 
an individual or a community by means of monetary or non-monetary incentives52 as follows: 
• Micropayments: these are monetary incentives that pay small fractions of a dollar to users that contribute data to 
the USN. Micropayments were developed in the 1990’s during the explosion of the Web as an incentive to sell 
online content53 for user-generated content. In the context of USNs, micropayments were first evaluated by Lee 
et al.54 by using algorithms for micropayments based on game theory.  
• Altruistic incentives: Users participate because of the benefits to the community that a USN can provide. 
Common examples include P-Sense6, the Personal Environmental Impact Report (PEIR)55, and NoiseSPY56.    
• Social incentives: In this category the incentives are social or human-centric rewards such as increase of 
reputation, improved health, or exposure from the interaction with other users with common objectives. 
Common examples in this group include e-bird57, fitness application such as Runtastic58 and game such as 
Pokemon GO59.  
5. Security Challenges for Ubiquitous Sensor Networks 
Human intervention, and trust in the devices, tasks, and task issuers are key aspects in the successful deployment 
of future USNs. In this context, we identify some of the current challenges that should be addressed to build more 
robust and secure USNs. These challenges include:  (1) trustworthy tasking; (2) data integrity for human-centric 
USNs; (3) privacy. 
• Trustworthy Tasking: USNs have been developed under the principle that the sensing task and whoever collects 
data are trusted. As such, most of the research in securing USNs assumes that threats are coming from the 
custodians of first-level integrator devices (e.g., by submitting fake data), or an external third-party with the goal of 
disrupting the USN (e.g., by executing a DoS attack on the USN). However, more research is needed on how to trust 
the data collection entity, the sensing task, and the security of the device itself, especially given the utilization of 
COTS devices as integrators and sensors. USN devices could be reprogrammed through a sensing task to steal data 
or could be used as zombies by botnets to attack external parties63, or the task may create physical harm to the user 
(e.g., theft, kidnapping, accidents) 64. 
• Data Integrity for Human-centric USNs: In a human-centric USN, a user usually has one type of sensor of each 
kind. For instance, a user has one heart rate sensor, one ECG sensor, and one breath depth sensor if using a wearable 
such as the Zephyr Bioharness 65, or there might be multiple sensors of one type (e.g., a heart rate sensor on a chest 
strap, and another on a smartwatch). Estimation and filtering of variables of interest in addition to redundancy of 
sensors/multiple first-level integrators as proposed for community-based USNs cannot be utilized because data in 
human-centric systems from a particular user are usually isolated from others due to privacy concerns. New 
techniques are needed to authenticate data in these scenarios. In addition, because feedback in human-centric 
systems could involve intrusive actions automatically (e.g., deliver medication without user intervention), novel 
methods are needed to continuously authenticate the user to ensure the effectiveness of these actions (i.e., some of 
these actions can generate life-threatening consequences). These authentication methods must have the following 
characteristics: 
• Non-repudiation: These methods must guarantee user identity with high assurance.  
• Unobtrusive: These methods must authenticate users without explicit user intervention. Continuous 
authentication methods that request users to authenticate regularly are unrealistic (i.e., not usable from the 
human-computer interaction perspective). 
• Power-aware: Many first-level integrators in human-centric USNs are battery-powered, thus continuous 
authentication methods that generate high power overhead for a first-level integrator device are not useful. 
•  Privacy: The ubiquity and use of mobile and Internet-connected devices as first-level integrators present a 
tradeoff: on one hand it is desired to collect data as accurately as possible, but on the other hand it is imperative that 
we collect or share data in a way that would preserve the privacy of users. Aspects such as context privacy (i.e., 
inference about the actions that could be obtained about users from the sensor data), bystander’s privacy (i.e., 
external people’s privacy that can be affected when collecting data in the USN), data sharing privacy (i.e., 
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controlling to whom a second-level integrator releases sensor data with), as well as ownership of sensor data remain 
open, emerging research issues that need further investigation. 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
We have reviewed some of the threats and solutions in security for ubiquitous sensor networks. Security issues 
were grouped into two major categories, namely data integrity and system availability. Although we have discussed 
some solutions that can be applied to secure USNs, more research is needed to handle several security issues such as 
trustworthy tasking, data integrity for human-centric USNs, as well as privacy. Given the current rate of adoption of 
mobile and IoT devices and their utilization in USNs, security will continue to play an important role in the future. 
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